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The first thing that should be emphasized about the Federal Employers' Liability
Act is that it is not in the nature of a workmen's compensation law, but is in fact
a special federal negligence law which gives the right to most of the employees of
the railroads to bring a negligence action against their employer for personal injuries suffered while on the job. The pertinent portion of Section i of the Act (45
U. S. C. §51) reads as follows:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the
several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee,
to his or her personal representative.., for such injury or death resulting in whole or in
part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier,
or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment. (Italics
supplied.)
To put this in a different way, if there are no facts which indicate negligence on the
part of the railroad, the employee has no right under the Act which can be successfully prosecuted. There are situations where a man is injured through no apparent
fault of his own and yet there cannot be shown any negligence on the part of the
carrier. Such an injured railroad employee is indeed unfortunate because he does
not have recourse to any state workmen's compensation law and there is no federal
compensation law to cover him, so that he is in the position of having no remedy
in any form for his injuries and damages, and if he is killed his widow is in a sad
situation legally as well as personally.
When counsel is consulted by an injured railroad employee the attorney should
remember that "negligence" under FELA is the same in variety and degree as in
any other type of personal injury action based on negligence. The attorney who is
counsel in an FELA case should, however, be aware of a number of differences
* In this article special attention is given to recent developments in the judicial doctrine of the
duty of the employer to furnish a reasonably safe place to work.
t Of Los Angeles, California; member of the California bar.

' Congress, of course, is the source of the Act. The original Act, passed in 19o6 (34 STAT. 232)
was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (19o8).
Congress, on April 22, 19o8 passed the present law, and on August xi, 1939 enacted certain amendments. 35 STAT. 65 (19o8), as amended by 36 STAT. 29X (191o), and 53 STAT. 1404 (939), 45
U. S. C. §§51-6o (946).
The FELA is also generally considered to embrace the Safety Appliance Acts, 27 STAT. 53X (1893),
as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§'-i6 (1946), and the Boiler Inspection Acts, 36 STAT. 913 (91), as
amended, 45 U. S. C. §§22-34 (946).
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between the case of an injured railroad employee and other types of negligence cases
such as arise in traffic accidents. I am going to cover the major differences in the
order in which they occur most naturally to me, for I do not know of any text which
sets forth the differences between the FELA and the ordinary law of negligence.
First of all, let me remind you that Section I of the Act states that the railroad is
responsible and shall be liable in damages for injuries or death resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of its agents or insufficiency in its equipment, etc.
The important words here are "in part." This means that, while the injured man's
employer may be only slightly negligent in a small part of the entire picture of
negligence, nevertheless, the carrier is responsible under the Act and can be made
responsible in damages. This becomes quite important in many situations. For
example, a switch engine may be moving over a public highway or crossing with a
switchman on the front footboard, which is a common place for him to be. A
truck may come along and, through gross negligence, fail to yield the right of way
to the switch engine and strike the engine, causing an injury to the switchman who
was on the front footboard of the engine. You might think that there would be no
vestige of liability upon the part of the railroad in such a picture. On the contrary,
if, for example, the switchman had given a slow-down signal or a stop signal and if
the engineer failed to heed these hand signals, you would have a case of liability
against the railroad even though it is very obvious that the truck is the principal
offender in this situation. In fact, in an ordinary negligence case, I think the attorney would be justified in advising his client that the carelessness of the truck
driver was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and that it would be difficult
to convince a jury (if one could indeed convince a judge, that he was entitled to get
to a jury) that the truck driver was not the real cause of injury and therefore the
sole proximate cause.
Under the FELA, however, the courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have rendered a number of decisions on the principle of proximate cause
which clearly indicate that the situation just outlined would constitute a case of
liability. In this discussion they have referred specifically to the two words, "in
part," appearing in Section I of the Act. A leading case on this subject is that of
Eglsaer v. ScandrettY There the facts were these: The train was stopped at Freeport,
Illinois, although its final destination was Milwaukee. The engineer of the train
decided to leave the cab and fix the automatic bell ringer, which had failed to work
automatically and which had thereafter been operated by hand. The engineer told
the fireman that he was going to do this. The fireman offered to go out and do
the job. The engineer, however, climbed out of the cab and on to the cat-walk
along the right side of the engine. The fireman continued with certain duties in
the cab which caused the escape of some steam so that the fireman could not see
the engineer or what he was doing. When the fireman received a proceed signal
from the brakeman he called to the engineer, and when the engineer did not
answer, the fireman went to look for him and found him lying on the ground on
the left side of the cab.
a 15 F. 2d 562, 564-566 (7th Cir. 1945).
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In this case there was no evidence available as to what caused the engineer to fall
from the cat-walk of the engine and receive the injuries which killed him. The
jury decided that the somewhat remote negligence of the defective bell ringer proximately caused the engineer's death. The trial judge in giving his reason for granting the motion of the defendant railroad to set aside the verdict of the jury, said in
effect:
* ' . No proof was introduced that Engineer Mackin ever touched any part of the
bell ringer mechanism or that he fell while attempting its repair or adjustment. The
burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish affirmative proof that the defective bell
ringer was the proximate cause. This the plaintiff has failed to do.
The opinion of the court of appeals was written by Judge Evans. It is a clear
statement of the law, showing how far the courts have gone in holding that even
a rather remote act of negligence may be in part the cause of injury or death and
therefore make the carrier responsible under the FELA. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and directed that judgment be entered conforming with the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. In doing so the court of appeals
said that the facts showed that: the engineer fell, was injured, and from his injuries
died; he was on the ground beneath the bell ringer which he had said he was going
out to repair; and the bell ringer was defective and the defendant's negligence with
respect to the defectiveness of the bell ringer was established. The court stated that
while it was true that the plaintiff-widow had no evidence showing that the defective bell ringer was the cause of death, the court thought, nevertheless, that the
defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of the accident. It appeared that
there was a loose rope attached to the bell ringer equipment, and the court said that
if the jury selected the theory that the loose rope was a proximate cause which may
have caused the engineer to fall from the engine then the jury was not speculating.
Therefore the court did not agree with the district court that there was no evidence
that the engineer's death resulted "in part" from the defective bell ringer, and reversed the decision of the lower court 3
The courts have not reversed this decision nor have they receded from this doctrine that the railroad's negligence may be only a part of the proximate cause or may
be of indirect inference. An attorney consulted by an injured railroad employee
therefore should examine the facts for any slight evidence of negligence on the part
of the railroad and should not be disturbed if it seems to him that in view of his
training in ordinary negligence actions there are one or more proximate causes
which are to him much more likely to be the true cause of the employee's injury.
The second major difference between ordinary negligence cases and FELA negligence cases has to do with that legal phrase "contributory negligence." In FELA
cases contributory negligence has been banished in favor of its much more humane
relation, comparative negligence. The law on this subject is contained in Section
3 (45 U. S. C. §53) of the Act, which reads as follows:
In all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad under
or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal
3The court oLappeals cited the decision of Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry., 321 U. S. 29 (x944).
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injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the
employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, that no such employee who may be injured or
killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the
violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees
contributed to the injury or death of such employee. (Italics supplied.)
A few citations on this point are sufficient since it has not been a controversial
section of the act.' First of all, there is the interesting comment of the California
court in Ericksen v. Southern Pacific Co.:5
Whether an emproyee . . . was guilty of contributory negligence is a matter in the first
instance for the jury to determine, and then on motion for new trial for the trial court.
The jury were fully and fairly instrticted on contributory negligence. As we cannot say
as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of such negligence, we cannot disturb the
verdict for lack of diminution, if there was such lack.
Second, in Terminal R. R. Ass'n v. Fitzjohn, the court held concerning contributory negligence:' Whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in riding on
the side ladder of a moving car, knowing there was a pole too close to the track,
was a question for the jury, and the jury's determination negating contributory
negligence on plaintiff's part could not be disturbed on appeal on the basis of
scienter or as a matter of law.
Third, in the case of Ellis v. Union Pacific R. R.,7 an engine foreman (in charge
of a switching crew) was injured when he was caught between the side of the railroad car he was riding on, and the side of the building adjacent to the track. The
court held that where there is shown any negligence whatever upon the part of the
carrier either in whole or in part proximately contributing to the plaintiff's injury,
the case must be submitted to the jury, irrespective of plaintiff's contributory negligence if any; and that plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, is a question for
the jury to determine.'
The third major difference between ordinary negligence actions and FELA cases
is that under the FELA there is no such thing as a defense based upon the theory
that an employee assumed the risks of his employment. I will discuss two cases
'Numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the several states are to be
found in the annotations, beginning at page 6io, of 45 U. S. C. A. (1943). None of these contravene
the intent and meaning of the language in this section, particularly the words which the writer has
underscored.
5 xo5 Advance Calif. Rep. 1o18, 234 P. 2d 279, 286 (195), afltd, 39 Cal. 2d 385, 246 P. 2d 642
(1952), cert. denied, 73 Sup. Ct. 277 (1952).
a x65 F. 2d 473, 477-478 (8th Cir. 1948).
7329

U. S. 649 (947).

The Court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on other grounds.

8At the request of the Chief Editor (the Honorable William J. Palmer, Judge of the Superior Court
in Los Angeles, California) of CA.IFORNA APPROVED JURY INSTRUGrMoNs (WEST PUBLISING CO., 1950),
the writer drafted a fairly complete set of jury instructions for FELA cases, which were incorporated
in the 195o Supplement (Part 4) (with some judicial modifications and with annotations by the editors).
Instructions Nos. 3 ox-J and 3 os-K are on comparative negligence. These instructions are now being given
by the judges of the California superior courts and by many of the judges of the United States district
courts in California. These comparative negligence instructions do not seem to confuse juries and, in
my opinion, would not confuse juries even in general negligence litigation.
The law on this subject is contained in Section 4 of the Act (45 U. S. C. §54). This section
is annotated beginning at page 695 of 45 U. S. C. A. (1943).
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only. Many times an employee receives an injury while violating one or more of
the company rules. I have been told by railroad men who have seniority whiskers
reaching down to their knees that it is impossible "to railroad right and to keep on
time" (sic) without violating a rule or so every day because the rules are so complex
and in certain ways contravene accepted practices in railroading. Counsel for the
plaintiff need not be disturbed if he finds that an injured employee has violated the
rules in some way, provided that he also finds from the facts that the company is
negligent either in commission or omission. In the case of Cross V. Spokane P. & S.
Ry, ° the Court held that the violation of a company rule does not constitute assumption of risk, and that at the very most it could constitute contributory negligence, leading to the reduction of the damages awarded.
Assumption of risk was finally and completely wiped out by a statutory amendUntil that time
ment of the FELA which became effective August 11, 1939.
there was considerable confusion in the courts about the doctrine of assumption of
risk and it became apparent that many of the courts were adhering to the earlier
harsh rule of assumption of risk, which tended to frustrate the law enacted by Congress, by decisions which spoke of "non-negligence" on the part of the carrier, and
by various other conceptions of the judicial mind. The first case to reach the United
States Supreme Court after the 1939 amendment abolishing the assumption of risk
was Tiller v.Atlantic Coast Line R. R.j2 The plaintiff's husband, who was a policeman for the railroad, was inspecting seals on the cars at night when he met death
by accident. The deceased was aware that no lights were used on the moving cars
and that no one would look out for him in making switching movements. There
was no evidence as to what he was doing at the time he was run over and killed.
The train which killed Tiller was backing up and there was a brakeman with a
lantern riding on the rear end on the side opposite to where Tiller was found.
The engine bell was ringing at the time of the accident. The federal district court
directed a verdict for the defendant railroad on the grounds that (i) the evidence
disclosed no actionable negligence, and (2) the cause of death was speculative and
conjectural. The court of appeals affirmed, 13 and certiorari was granted because
the lower court's decision was based on a holding that the deceased had in effect
assumed the risk of his position and therefore there was no duty owed him by the
railroad. The Supreme Court in its opinion indicated that it recognized that in
decisions previous to the x939 amendment assumption of risk had sometimes been
recognized as a defense to negligence, and sometimes had been held equivalent to
non-negligence. The Court then stated:
We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated
from the law by the 1939 Amendment, and that Congress, by abolishing the defense of
assumption of risk in that statute, did not mean to leave open the identical defense for
the master by changing its name to "non-negligence."' 5
102 83 U. S. 821 (x931).
"153 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. §54 (1946).
1"38 U. S. 54 (1943).
isX28 F. 2d 420 ( 4 th Cir. 1942).
143x8 U. S. at 58.
" The Tiller case was before the Court a second time,.Avith the same result. 323 U. S. 574 (x945).
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The next point I want to cover is that under the FELA the employee is entitled
to be furnished a reasonably safe place to work. This principle I shall cover in
detail for two reasons: First, it includes a large percentage of the legal actions which
arise under the FELA, and second, under this doctrine the courts as "the living
voice of the law" have steadily extended protection to injured railroad workers,
including the spelling out of the recent interesting doctrine of the legal responsibility of the carrier to take "additional precautions" under certain circumstances.
I
NowHERE IN Tim FELA Is THIS DOCTRINE MENTIONED, So WE MUST LOOK TO THE
COURT DECISIONS FOR GUIDANCE

A leading case which indicates the all-inclusive interpretation of the United
States Supreme Court which is expressly intended to furnish the highest degree of
legal redress for injured railroad workers is Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. ' Bailey,
a section hand, was killed by falling from a bridge while dumping a hopper car of
cinders through the ties of the bridge to the road below. He was using a wrench
which had been used for this purpose for years without accident. There was no
defective equipment and the work was being done in the customary way. Bailey
had been warned that the wrench would twist around if he did not let go of it before the hopper started to open. He failed to let go of the wrench soon enough;
the wrench did twist around, causing Bailey to lose his balance and fall to his death.
The widow sued under the FELA, alleging that the railroad had failed to furnish
a safe place to work. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Douglas, sustained the plaintiff's case on the following grounds: The hopper car
could have been opened before it was moved onto the bridge, or the cinders could
have been dumped on the roadbed and later shoved onto the bridge to fall on the
road below. The Court said that the nature of Bailey's work, the absence of a
guard rail, the height of the bridge from the ground, the space he had to stand in,
the footing which he had, were all facts for the jury to weigh and appraise, and that
it was for the jury to decide whether the railroad was negligent.
In the Bailey case the Supreme Court decision emphasized that the jury is the
tribunal under our legal system to decide any debatable issue where fair-minded men
might reach different conclusions. The Court said that the right to trial by jury is
a basic and fundamental feature of our system of jurisprudence and that to withdraw
debatable questions from the jury is to usurp its function.
Mr. Justice Douglas also pointed out in the Bailey decision that the duty of the
railroad to furnish a reasonably safe place to work is a continuing one "from which
the carrier is not relieved by the fact that the employee's work at the place in question in fleeting or infrequent."'" The last point should be noted by any attorneys
who are interested in conducting FELA litigation, as it would come up repeatedly
in practice.
%a
3I9 U. S. 350 (1943).
27 id. at
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II
FAILURE TO FURNISH A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE TO WORK MAY BE BASED UPON THE

FACT THAT EQUIPMENT USED BY THE EMPLOYEE

Is

NoT

REASONABLY SAFE

In the case of Carpenter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., s the court found
that it was a question for the jury to decide whether the railroad had furnished a
reasonably safe place to work under circumstances which concerned a motor car
accident. Plaintiff's husband was killed when the railroad motor car he was
operating was struck by a truck at a crossing. The motor car was so insulated that
it would not operate crossing wigwags or other signals; it had no bell, whistle, or
other warning device. There was evidence that it was going i5-2o m.p.h. instead
of the io m.p.h. to which company rules limited it at crossings; the rules also
required it to yield the right of way to traffic at crossings and to flag over crossings
during dense traffic. In this action for wrongful death under the FELA judgment
went for defendant in the trial court but the appellate court reversed, pointing out
that: (I) In determining the question whether there was any evidence of negligence
which should have been submitted to the jury, the federal statutes and decisions controlled. (2) The Act was to be given a liberal construction in order to accomplish
10
its humanitarian purposes.
Under it [the FELA] the duty ... upon defendant is io use reasonable care in furnishing its employees with a safe place to work. ... The term negligence, as used in the act,
is a violation of that duty. The employer is liable for injuries which can be attributed
to conditions under its control when they are not such as a reasonable man ought to
(3) Where the evidence is such that fair-minded men
maintain in the circumstances ....
might honestly draw different conclusions as to the existence of negligence on the part of
the defendant. . . . the question is not one of law, but one of fact to be settled by the
jury. . . . (4) The rules governing the determination of a motion such as here made
under Section 63o of the Code of Civil Procedure are the same as those applicable to
(5) The ... Act imposes
motions for a judgment of nonsuit and a directed verdict ....
a liability on a common carrier by railroad for injuries to or the death of an employee resulting in whole or in part from its negligence. (6) We cannot say as a matter of law
that the defendant railroad complied with its duties in a reasonably careful manner
under the circumstances shown, nor that the conduct which a jury might find to be
negligent did not contribute in whole or in part to the injuries received by the decedent.
(Italics supplied.)
THE

SLIGHTEST SHOWING OF NEGLIGENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE CASE TO THE

JURY, AND PRECLUDES A DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE CASE THROUGH THE
LEGAL PROCESS OF NoN-sUIT, DIRECTED VERDICT, OR SIMILAR LEGAL DEVICE

The Tiller case2 ° is an example of the conclusiveness of the Supreme Court's
decision that the question of negligence in FELA cases must go to the jury. Tiller
was killed when he was struck by several cars which were being moved by an
engine in backward motion at night. The evidence indicated that there was no
sxog Advance Calif. Rep. x7, 240 P. 2d 5 (X952).
at 7, 8. Author's note: Remember that the deceased had been riding on a rail motor car,
and various mechanical devices were here involved.
2' Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 323 U. S. 574 (1945).
'gId.
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light burning on the rear of the engine at the time of the backup movement. There
was other evidence that even if there had been a light burning it would not have been
visible to Tiller. The deceased was aware that no lights were used on the moving
cars and that no one would look out for him in making switching movements.
There was no evidence as to what he was doing at the time he was run over and
killed. There was a brakeman with a lighted lantern riding on the rear end of the
cut of cars on the side opposite to where Tiller was found. The engine bell was
ringing at the time of the accident. This case was tried twice. The second time the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but the court of appeals 2 reversed,
and certiorari was granted because of the importance of this case as it related to the
administration and enforcement of the FELA. The court of appeals had held that
the evidence of negligence was insufficient to justify submitting the case to the jury,
and that the district court should have directed a verdict in favor of the railroad.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover and that it
was for the jury to determine whether or not the failure to provide the required
lights on the rear of the locomotive proximately contributed to the deceased's death.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion, and said in part:22
It was for the jury to determine whether the failure to provide this required light
on the rear of the locomotive proximately contributed to the deceased's death. The
ruling of the court below that it was not a proximate cause was based on this reasoning:
The general railroad practice in yard movements is to push cars attached to the rear of an
engine; no express regulation of the Commission prohibits this; in the instant case the
cars attached to the engine necessarily would have obscured any light on the rear of that
engine; the light so obscured would not have enabled the engineer to see 300 feet backwards so as to avoid injuring the deceased nor would the light have been visible to the
deceased standing at or near the track ahead of the backward movement. Therefore,
the court concluded, the failure to furnish the light was not proximately related to the
death of Tiller.
Assuming, without deciding, the railroad could consistently with Rule 131 obscure
the required light on the rear of the engine, it does not follow that, as a matter of law,
failure to have the light did not contribute to Tiller's death. The deceased met his
death on a dark night, and the diffused rays of a strong headlight even though directly
obscured from the front, might easily have spread themselves so that one standing within
three car-lengths of the approaching locomotive would have been given warning of its
presence, or at least so the jury might have found. The backward movement of cars
on a dark night in an unlit yard was potentially perilous to those compelled to work
in the yard. Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 33. And "The standard
of care must be commensurate to the dangers of the business." Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., supra.
In the Tennant case23 referred to above in the opinion in the Tiller case, there
were no eye witnesses to the accident, and the jury had found a verdict for the
plaintiff, which was reversed by the court of appeals. 24 In finding for the plaintiff
and reversing the court of appeals, which found there was not enough evidence to
2 142 F. 2d 78 ( 4 th Cir. X944).
22 323 U. S. at 578-579.

"Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. R., 3z' U. S. 29 (i944).
134 F. 2d 86o (7th Cir. 1943).
14
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take the case to the jury, Mr. Justice Murphy stated that there was some evidence of
negligence which, together with the presumption that Tennant was exercising due
care to preserve his life, was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. The opinion
of the Supreme Court in the Tennant case is so positive in indicating that in these
cases even the slightest evidence of negligence is a jury question, that I quote from
the language of the Supreme Court" as the best way of emphasizing this point:
In holding that there was no evidence upon which to base the jury's inference as to
causation, the court below emphasized other inferences which are suggested by the conflicting evidence. Thus it was said to be unreasonable to assume that Tennant was
standing on the track north of the engine in the performance of his duties. It seemed
more probable to the court that he seated himself on the footboard of the engine and fell
asleep. Or he may have walked back unnoticed to a point south of the engine and been
killed while trying to climb through the cars to the other side of the track. These and
other possibilities suggested by diligent counsel for respondent all suffer from the same
lack of direct proof as characterizes the one adopted by the jury ...
It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial
evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives
equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point of judicial review
is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is
the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and
draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its functions is to
select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most
reasonable . . . That conclusion, whether it relates to negligence, causation, or any
other factual matter, cannot be ignored. Courts are not free to re-weigh the evidence
ahd set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different infera
ences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable. (Italics
supplied.)
There are many other cases which reiterate and reemphasize that the jury is the
proper tribunal to decide the facts in FELA cases.28

IV
THE FACT THAT THE WORK-PLACE Is AWAY FROM RAILROAD-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
PROPERTY

DoEs NOT

RELIEVE THE RAILROAD OF LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF AN

UNSAFE PLACE TO WORK

In the case of Ericksen v. Southern Pacific Ca.,2" the court held that it was
immaterial that the place where plaintiff worked was not under the control of the
defendant railroad, since the defendant required the plaintiff to work there. The
plaintiff was employed by defendant to select railroad ties for it to purchase. Cheney
Lumber Company was a supplier which plaintiff frequently visited for that purpose.
He had to stand on a dock, over io feet above the tracks, where the ties were loaded.
There was so little room for him to stand where the ties were flush with the end of
5 321 U. S. at 34-35.
' Two other cases which indicate clearly that the question of negligence in an FELA action is one to

be determined exchsively by the jury are Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 (1949), and Butz V.
Union Pacific R. R., 233 P. 2d 332 (Utah, 195).
27 1o5 Advance Calif. Rep. 1o8, 234 P. 2d 279 (5951), afl'd, 39 Cal. 2d 385, 246 P. 2d 642 (1952),
cert. denied, 73 Sup. Ct. 277 (1952).
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the dock that he had to lean over to inspect the ends. In so doing he fell and was
badly injured. He won damages in this FELA suit. On appeal the verdict was
affirmed; the court reasoned as follows: (i) The Act applies only to employees of a
railroad who are employed in interstate commerce. He was thus employed, since
the ties were eventually placed on tracks used in interstate commerce. (2) To recover, the employee must prove that his injuries were proximately caused by his
employer's negligence-here the failure to provide a safe place for plaintiff to perform his duties. The fact that the place was not in defendant's control is immaterial.
It is also immaterial that plaintiff was his own boss at the scene, since he could not
require Cheney or its employees to change the method of placing the ties. (3) An
award of $i8,ooo, of which about $i5,ooo was general damages, was not so excessive
as to indicate passion or prejudice of the jury. He suffered a crushing fracture of
the heel, resulting in a great deal of hospital treatment, disability, and pain during
some three years-he was brought to court on a stretcher-and permanent difficulty
in walking on uneven ground. (4) Whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent
was first for the jury to determine, then for the judge on a motion for new trial.
The jury having been fully instructed on the subject, it cannot be said as a matter
of law that he was negligent, and the 'verdict cannot be disturbed for lack of
diminution, if there was such lack.'
In the case of Terminal RailrbadAssociation v. Fitzlohn, 8 the plaintiff, who was
acting as engine foreman in charge of a switching crew, was injured when he was
knocked off the side of the car by a light standard or upright located too dose to the
rail. The track involved was on property owned by the United States Government,
and the plaintiff actually knew of the existence of the upright. The court held the
railroad responsible, stating that it is well established that the railroad has the
same duty to furnish its employees with a reasonably safe place in which to work
while on the premises of another as it does while the employees are on the premises
of the railroad.
V
EVEN IF THE EMPLOYEE HAPPENS TO USE AN UNSAFE PLACE WHEN A SAFE PLACE Is

AVAILABLE, THE DocTaNE AND THE DUTY OF THE RAILROAD STILL APPLY
In Wilkaerson v. McCarthy,29 the Court first announced this principle of law. The
plaintiff, a train service employee, was injured while trying to cross an engine pit
on a greasy plank, as he headed for the lavatory . There was a clear, safe pathway
which he could traverse to reach the lavatory, but this route was slightly longer than
the route which he choose to use. The engine pit which the plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to cross was guarded by a chain designed to keep away from that area
personnel who were not employed in repairing the engines. The plaintiff squeezed
between some cars, ducked under the guard chain, and started across the plank over
the engine pit. He slipped on grease on the plank and fell into the pit, sustaining
severe injuries. The Utah supreme court agreed with the trial judge that this was
not a case in which there was sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the
EQUALLY

2x65 F. 2d 473 (8th Cir. 1948).

20 336 U. S. 53 (1949).
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carrier to submit the case to the jury. 0 Certiorari was granted and the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the carrier is under an obligation to keep all of the
premises and all of the places of work in a reasonably safe condition. The Court
held that evidence had been offered that the greasy plank was not in reasonably
safe condition, and that it was a question for a jury to decide whether or not this
greasy plank proximately contributed to the plaintiff's injury. The Court further
held that although the plaintiff had available to him a safer but longer route of
travel, this did not as a matter of law justify taking the case away from the jury.
The principle of law established by this decision has not been repudiated or
changed, and in fact my partner recently won a case where the trial judge would
have apparently refused to permit the case to go to the jury if counsel had not
submitted to him the decision of the court in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, since the facts
in our case involved the use of an unsafe way of descending from a railroad platform where there existed a safe ramp which was less conveniently located than the
way used by the employee who suffered injury.
VI
RAILROAD Is UNDER A DuTY To WARN AN EMPLOYEE OF ANY CONDITION OR
CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH Is HAzARDous To AN EMPLOYEE IN His PACE OF WORK,
WHERE SUCH.CONDITION OR CIRCUMSTANCE Is oR SHOULD BE

THE

THE RAILROAD
In TerminalRailroadAssociation m, Howell,3' the employee was attempting to close
the door on a railroad car, working under instructions from his foreman, and while
so doing was injured. The defense of the railroad was that the employee should have
KNOWN TO

been able to see that this defective door was a hazard, and that therefore the employee
caused his own injury. The court held that the foreman knew or should have
known that the defective door presented a hazardous condition, and that since the
foreman failed to give any warning to the employee the carrier had failed to furnish
the employee with a reasonably safe place to work.

VII
WHETHER THE RAILROAD

HAS NonIcE,

ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, OF AN UNSAFE PLACE

TO WORK Is A MATTrER To BE LEFT ENTIRELY TO THE JURY

In Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Flechtner, " the plaintiff stepped on a barrel hoop
near a track, fell under a car, and lost his foot. While the yard was not fenced in,
the public did not usually enter there. The hoop was rusty, and it was the kind of
hoop used on kegs which hold railroad spikes. The court held that the rusty condition of the hoop was sufficient to indicate it had been in the switch yard a considerable time, so that the railroad in the exercise of ordinary care should have known
that the hoop was there and had it removed, and that therefore the railroad had
failed to furnish the employee with a reasonably safe place to work.
In Lowden v. Hanson,3 3 the plaintiff while throwing a spring switch was injured when the handle broke because of a structural defect. There was no showing
30 112

Utah 300, x87 P. 2d 188 (947).
318 (6th Cir. 1924).

323oo Fed.

32 x65 F. 2d 135 (8th Cir. 1948).
38 134 F. 2d 348 (5th Cir. 1943).
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that the company had either actual or constructive notice of this defect. There was,

however, testimony by a railroad man that the defect in the switch could have been
discovered by tapping the parts of the switch stand with a hammer. He testified

that if a tapping test was made a dull sound would be given off where there was a
cracked or defective part inside the switch stand. The court held that the failure of

the railroad to inspect the switch as indicated by the witness constituted a lack of
ordinary care and imposed liability upon the railroad under the Act.

VIII
WHERE THE UNSAFE PLACE TO WORK GIvEs RISE To AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
RATHER THAN A TRAUMATIC INJURY, THE RAILROAD Is NoNE THE LESS LIABLE

In Urie v. Thompson,34 the plaintiff, a former fireman on one of defendant's
steam locomotives, filed suit in a state court to recover under the FELA for injuries,

alleging that after thirty years of service he had been forced to cease work by silicosis
caused by continuous inhalation of silica dust which arose from sand materials
emitted in excessive amounts by the locomotives' faultily adjusted sanding apparatus.
Upon the plaintiff's first appeal from an adverse judgment the state supreme court
held3" that the petition failed to state a cause of action for negligence under the
FELA, but stated one under the Boiler Inspection Act, and hence remanded
the cause for trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
$3o,ooo, based solely on a violation by the defendant of the Boiler Inspection Act.
This judgment was reversed by the state supreme court on the ground that the
Boiler Inspection Act did not cover silicosis, that is, disease as distinguished from
injury30
Reversing the judgment of the state supreme court, the United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, unanimously held that the question

whether the plaintiff's original petition stated a cause of action for negligence under
the FELA was properly reviewable by the Court; that the action, as it was brought
within three years from the discovery by the plaintiff of the disease, was not barred
by the statue of limitations; and that silicosis is within the coverage of the FELA,
when it results from the employer's negligence.
IX

THE

EMPLOYEE Is NOT REQUIRED TO ANTICIPATE UNSAFE CONDITIONS IN THE WORK
PLACE AND TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO DIsCOvER THEM

In the case of Harness v. Baltimore and 0. R. R. 37 the court held that where an
employee is without knowledge of risks of employment because of the negligence

of the employer, he need not anticipate and take precautions to discover them, but
may assume that the employer has provided a reasonably safe place to work.

a 337 U.

S. x63 (1949).

as 352 Mo. 211, 176 S. W. 2d 471 (i943).
357 Mo. 738, 210 S. W, 2d 98 (1948).
'7 86 W. Va. 284, 103 S. E. 866 (i920).
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X
IF EXTRAORDINARY PRECAUTIONS BY THE RAILROAD COULD HAVE ANTICIPATED AND
PREVENTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN UNSAFE PLACE TO WORK THE RAILROAD IS
LIABLE, AND

THIs Is

TRUE EVEN THOUGH THE RAILROAD DOES NOT HAVE

CONTROL OF THE PLACE WHERE THE EMPLOYEE IS INJURED

In Butz v.Union Pacific R. R., s the plaintiff was injured while riding on the
side of a baggage car being pushed on a baggage track which ran adjacent to the
platform of the Denver Union Terminal Company, which was not a part of the
Union Pacific Railroad. He was hurt by a baggage truck which was so close to the
track that there was not sufficient clearance for his body between the side of the
baggage car and the baggage truck. The trial judge granted a non-suit after hearing
the plaintiff's evidence. The Utah supreme court stated that from the evidence in
the record the court assumed that the baggage truck was left afoul of the clearance
line by employees of the Terminal Company, and not by employees of the Union
Pacific Railroad. The court pointed out:30 "It is settled beyond question that it is
the duty of the employer to exercise reasonable care to furnish his employees a
reasonably safe place to work, and this includes situations where the employer sends
his employee on the premises of another to perform his duties."4
The problem in the case was the argument of the defendant which maintained
that there was no basis for either its actual or constructive knowledge of a condition
of danger which apparently existed through no fault of employees of the defendant
Union Pacific Railroad. The court stated that the plaintiff's attention had to be
divided between the security of his position on the side of the car, watching the
track ahead, passing any necessary signals to the engineer respecting the movement of
the train and its proper stopping place, and watching his clearance with the baggage
trucks. Under those circumstances (said the court) could reasonable minds say
that the defendant should have taken other precautions in providing plaintiff with
a reasonably safe place to perform his duties?
The court 41 quotes the following from Boston & M. R. R. v. Meech :42
From the foregoing, it is clear that although some precautions were taken for the
decedent's safety, further precautions were possible, and from this it follows, as we read
the decisions cited above, that there was an "evidentiary basis" for submitting the issue
of the defendant's causal negligence to the jury. (Italics supplied.)
The Utah court goes on to say that to apply literally the rule-"further precautions were possible"--would not be sound because there would be no conceivable
injury which hindsight could not have prevented by some precaution. The test,
therefore, is whether in the exercise of ordinary prudence and care the railroad
35
8233 P. 2d 332 (Utah, 1951).
2 P. 2d at 334.
233
In support of this position the court cites a number of cases, including Terminal Railroad Ass'n
v. Fitzjohn, supra note 28, and Ellis v. Union Pacific R. R., 329 U. S. 649 (1947).
4" 233 P. 2d at 335.
42 156 F. 2d og, III (ist Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 763 (1946).
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should have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of injury, and whether additional
precautions should have been taken by the defendant to provide plaintiff with a
safe place to work was therefore a question for the jury. As the court states,43
What the employee wants and needs is a reasonably safe place to perform his duties.
He is not concerned with, and indeed cannot know the technicalities of ownership, rental,
lease, or reciprocal exchange of facilities of an involved railroad system. .

.

. The em-

ployer exercises exclusive choice both as to the place of work and control over safety
factors. It is therefore not unreasonble to charge him with the duty of providing a safe
place to work.
The court then points out that in the Wilkerson case, Mr. Justice Douglas reviewed the 55 petitions for certiorari from 1943 to 1949 in these cases, 2o of said

writs being granted. The Utah supreme court in conclusion makes the following
statement,4 4 which should be noted and remembered by every member of the bar
who believes in the right to trial by jury:
This history, together with the language of the adjudicated cases, including the
Wilkerson case itself, point to one inescapable conclusion: The Supreme Court of the
United States says with unequivocal certainty that wherever a railroad employee under
F.E.L.A. is injured in the course of duty and there is any evidentiary basis upon which
reasonable minds could believe that reasonable care might have required additional
safety measures which were not taken, and which contributed in whole or in part to
cause the injury, the case should be tried by a jury. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
Co., 318 U. S.54, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 61o; Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S.645, 66
S. Ct. 74 o , 9o L. Ed. 916; and see the case of Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U. S.752,
62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. Ii66, wherein Mr. Justice Murphy speaking for the court
stated: "The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the
Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the courts."
With this sentiment we are in accord. (Italics supplied.)
From these decisions we can reasonably conclude and the writer does conclude:
(I) To entitle the plaintiff to a recovery under the FELA it must be shown
that there is some negligence (however slight) upon the part of the carrier.
(2) If there is any evidence from which a jury could infer negligence upon the
the part of the defendant, the court shall not interfere with the jury's right to render
a verdict nor set aside a verdict once rendered upon any factual question, and any
deviation from the latter principle will constitute reversible error.
(3)Plaintiff is not required to prove that the carrier had actual or constructive
notice as to an unsafe condition at the place he is injured to entitle him to have
a determination by the jury, and the presumption is that the employer has notice
since he controls places of work and/or the assignments which the employee
must carry out 5
43233 P. 2d at 336.

"Id.at 336-337.
"See Butz v. Union Pacific R.R., supra note 38, and cases cited therein.
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I think I should comment briefly on the part that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
plays in relation to FELA cases. Several years ago a judge, who shall go unnamed,
asked me toward the end of a very weak liability case if it was not a fact that the
doctrine of res ispa loquitur does not apply to FELA cases. I immediately endeavored to use this theory on the judge, because of course the doctrine does apply,
but I lost the case anyway.
A California case," which I think is most useful, is Leet v. Union PacificR. R.4
Here the California supreme court in effect stated that the plaintiff may produce
and offer evidence of specific acts of negligence and shall not be penalized for
bringing in all of the specific and definite evidence he has, and that therefore
although he does produce specific evidence, he shall be entitled to the benefits of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and have an instruction given to the jury to this effect.
The United States Supreme Court case which I feel is the most helpful on this
point is Iesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. R.4 In this case a switchman was killed
at night. He had thrown a switch, and then apparently signalled the train to back
up. His body was not found at a place where he should have been. The lower
court held" that res ipsa loquitur did not apply for the reason that the switchman
evidently participated in the switching movement which led to his death. The lower
court said that therefore the defendant railroad was not in complete control of the
agency which caused his death and denied the benefit of res ipsa loquitur. The
Supreme Court held that the fact that the switchman participated to some extent
did not foreclose the right of the widow-plaintiff to have the benefit of res ipsa
loquitur. The Court said that the deceased was presumed to have used due care
for his safety and that the backing up of the train did kill him. Therefore, said
the Court, it was proper that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be invoked and it
was a question for the jury to decide whether the railroad was responsible for the
death of Jesionowski.
I am going to conclude"' by stating some general and rather positive conclusions.
This, I realize, is a dangerous practice-dangerous, that is, to the one who offers the
generalizations. Nonetheless, I am going to offer a few rules of thumb which I
think cover generally the analysis and trial of FELA cases.
First, does the case come under the Act? The Act says it covers employees of
common carriers by rail in interstate commerce. So, this rules out bus drivers
(even for companies owned by the railroads), employees of the Pullman Company,
and those of car companies such as the PacificFruit Express.
Second, is the injured employee in interstate commerce? There are many cases
"'Ithink that two citations are sufficient for me to give here, although there are dozens of cases
from California and other states, and also federal cases, on the point.
7 5 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (1944).
This is not a unanimous decision, but the dissenting
opinion concurs on this point.
48 329 U. S. 452 (1947).
49 r54 F. 2d 703 (1st Cir.

1946).

will not endeavor to cover the various phases of the law under the Safety Appliance Acts and
the Boiler Inspection Act for that would be impossible in the space allotted to me.
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on this aspect but it seems to me that a general rule of thumb is: If you took all
the men away from the railroad who were doing the particular job or type of work
the injured man was doing, would this substantially affect the carrying on of interstate commerce? If so, the employee is in interstate commerce. This is obviously
not a precise and all-inclusive definition, but it will help counsel who are not familiar
with this type of case.
Third, is there any negligence whatever on the part of the carrier irrespective
of how negligent you may think the injured railroad man might have been? If so,
there is a liability case.
Fourth, did the injured man file an accident report with the company, and if so,
does he have a copy of it for you?
Fifth, in addition to any general negligence of the railroad, is there a violation
of the Boiler Inspection Act or the Safety Appliance Acts? If so, this should be
pleaded in addition to the allegation of general negligence under Section I. The
allegations need not be divided into separate causes of action.
Sixth, do not plead that an injured railroad man is totally and permanently
disabled on the theory that you are doing him a favor upon the supposition that
subsequent medical studies may tend to show that this is a fact. You do not need
to plead total and permanent disability, and by a proper allegation of disability
which may extend over an indefinite future time, you give him all the protection
that he needs. This point cannot be overemphasized because if you plead and
endeavor to prove permanent and total disability you may by process of law deprive
the injured railroad man of the most valuable thing he has, his seniority rights.
Seniority rights are property rights. They have been lost for railroad men through
their attorneys overpleading the case.
Seventh, prospective jurors should be made to understand that the injured railroad
man has not received any compensation from any source whatever, and that he
does not come under the benefits of any compensation law. I have found superior
court judges very reasonable in allowing questions on voir dire to insure that the
prospective jurors understand this. I have also found that if you will submit in
writing a proper statement and special questions to the federal judges they are very
conscientious about conveying to the prospective jurors the fact that the injured
railroad man does not have any workmen's compensation coverage whatever. Unless this is made known to the prospective jurors, counsel may have a sad experience
in receiving a low verdict and being later informed by the jurors that they thought
the verdict was adequate in addition to the "compensation" that the man had received. At this point counsel explains to the jurors that his client did not receive
any "compensation" and the jurors are amazed, but counsel is horrified, because
he explained too little and too late.
Eighth, in trying your case remember that you are entitled to use the company
rule book. This is the "Bible" under which the men work, and if any of the rules
have been violated you may read these rules into evidence and argue them to the jury,
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showing that the company or its agents violated the rules, and that this was part of
the cause of the injury to your client. 5 Last but not least, counsel for the plaintiff should never forget in an FELA
case that he is representing an employee who has been hurt while on duty and that
the employee has no compensatory relief except to come to the forum of the
courtroom to apply to the jurors for his only compensation for his wage loss on
account of on-duty injuries and for loss of earning power and for his pain and
suffering. It is of the greatest importance that counsel make the jury understand
this basic proposition. If this is done, and the evidence is presented fairly and
properly, any competent attorney will, I am sure, obtain an equitable result in an
FELA case.
"1lncidentally, the company rules may be used in lawsuits where a member of the general public
is the plaintiff. Southern Pacific Co. v. Haight, 126 F. 2d 900 (9th Cir. 1942); Nelson v. Southern
Pacific Co., 8 Cal. 2d 648, 67 P. 2d 682 (1937). Also the provisions of the Safety Appliance Acts have
been held to be for the benefit of the general public as well as for employees. United States v. State
of California, 296 U. S. 554 (1935). The Boiler Inspection Act also is for the protection of passengers
and the general public as well as employees. Uric v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163 (1949). See the
annotation in ir A. L. R. 2d 252 (949).

